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I. INTRODUCTION
Electronic surveillance in the United States is governed primarily by the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA").] Most of ECPA's
provisions date from 1986, before the public Internet, widespread mobile
telephone service, cloud computing or social networking.2 The challenge of
applying ECPA's framework to technologies its drafters did not anticipate has
become a source of increasing frustration for courts, law enforcement agencies,
service providers and ordinary citizens. 3
A number of organizations have spearheaded credible and serious reform
efforts that show promise of bringing ECPA into the 21st Century, but the
Partner, Wilkinson Barker Knauer, LLP; Adjunct Lecturer, Columbus School of Law, The
Catholic University of America; J.D. 1976, University of Chicago. The views expressed in
his article are the author's, and do not represent the opinions of Wilkinson Barker Knauer,
LLP or its clients. The author is an individual member of the Digital Due Process Coalition.
Who We Are, DIGITAL DUE PROCESS COALITION, http://commcns.org/rSDiFO (last visited
Dec. 15, 2011).
1 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006).
2 See Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications: A
Critical Perspective on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1557, 1557-1558, 1572-1575 (2004). See also Mary Madden & Kathryn Zickuhr, 65% of
Online Adults Use Social Networking Sites, PEW INTERNET AND LIFE PROJECT 2 (2011),
http://commcns.org/snM341; Arif Mohamed, A History of Cloud Computing,
COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM (Mar. 27, 2009), http://commcns.org/u46AzZ; Background on
CTIA's Semi-Annual Wireless Industry Survey, CTIA - THE WIRELESS ASSOCIATION 2-3
(2011), http://commcns.org/uxmOzT.
See Electronic Communications Privacy Act Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 11Ith
Cong. 10-12 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 ECPA Hearing] (statement of James X. Dempsey,
Vice President for Public Policy, Center for Democracy & Technology),
http://commcns.org/w2Scaf See also Mulligan, supra note 2, at 1558.
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proposed reforms are incomplete.4 For example, these efforts do not address
foreign intelligence surveillance and the voluntary exchange of customer
information among private entities.5 While there are sound reasons for
deferring solutions to such questions, these issues should not be avoided
indefinitely.6
This article explores these questions by first describing the background and
structure of ECPA. Next, it describes the specific, ongoing efforts to reform the
statute. It concludes by recommending the adoption of reforms proposed by the
Digital Due Process Coalition, and discussing additional reforms that must be
considered in order to complete the project of bringing ECPA into the 21st
Century.
II. ECPA: ITS BACKGROUND, TERMS AND STRUCTURE
ECPA is best understood against the background of the statute it amended:
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 ("Title Ill" or "1968
Act").7 The 1968 Act was a direct response to two landmark decisions of the
United States Supreme Court: United States v. Katz, in which the Court held
that the bugging of a telephone booth was a search subject to the protections of
the Fourth Amendment, and Berger v. New York, in which the Court, applying
Fourth Amendment principles, set out an exacting set of "superwarrant"
requirements for court orders authorizing electronic surveillance. The 1968
Act was the first federal statute to place effective limits on the ability of
4 In re Information Privacy and Innovation in the Internet Economy, Comments of Digital
Due Process Coalition, Nat'1 Telecomms. Info. Admin. Docket No. 100402174-0175-01, at
1-2, 6-7 (June 14, 2010), http://commcns.org/sVfGlh; Declan McCullagh, Obama Faces
Mai or Online Privacy Test, CNET NEWS (March 30, 2010), http://commcns.org/tWYqyN.
Such as for advertising purposes. See discussion, infra Part II.B. See generally In re
Information Privacy and Innovation in the Internet Economy, Comments of Digital Due
Process Coalition, Nat'l Telecomms. Info. Admin. Docket No. 100402174-0175-01 (June
14, 2010), http://commcns.org/sVfGlh (remaining silent on the issues of voluntary
disclosure of customer communications and personal information to private entities).
6 Notably, deferring reform of the voluntary disclosure provisions of ECPA keeps the
focus on governmental action, which presents the greater risk to civil liberties. Also,
deferring recommendations for change to the intelligence-gathering practices sanctioned by
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act keeps the focus on ECPA and avoids involving the
intelligence community in the present debate. See 2010 ECPA Hearing, supra note 3, at 69-
70 (memorandum from J. Beckwith Burr, Partner, Wilmer, Cutler, Pickering, Hale, and
Dorr, LLP).
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197
(1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006).
8 See Mulligan, supra note 2, at 1577 n.157; United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 353
(1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 62-64 (1967). These decisions overturned the
Court's 1928 finding that wiretapping was not a search or seizure subject to Fourth
Amendment protections. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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government to intercept private communications. 9
A. Statutory Framework of Title III
Title III marked the boundaries of electronic surveillance by both state and
federal officials, and criminalized certain surveillance activities by private
parties.' 0  Specifically, it criminalized wiretapping and electronic
eavesdropping by making it an offense to intercept any wire or oral
communication, except as permitted by the statute.II Governmental entities
were prohibited from intercepting any wire or oral communication without the
consent of a party or, alternatively, an interception order obtained in
accordance with a rigorous Berger superwarrant process.12 Private parties
could only intercept wire and oral communications when a statutory exception
applied, such as the consent of a party to the conversation.' 3
The 1968 Act's limits on interception were largely determined by the
definitions of its terms. Notably, "intercept" was defined as "the aural
acquisition of the contents of any wire or oral communication through the use
9 Before the 1968 Act was passed, the principal constraint on federal wiretapping was
section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934, which stated, among other provisions, that
"no person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and
divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such
intercepted communication to any person." 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1952). As interpreted by the
courts and federal law enforcement agencies, section 605 had a number of limitations;
notably, it did not apply to the states and it offered no remedy for wiretaps that did not result
in an effort to introduce the information obtained into evidence. See Michael Goldsmith,
The Supreme Court and Title III: Rewriting the Law of Electronic Surveillance, 74 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 11-13, 32 (1983); Daniel J. Solove, Surveillance Law: Reshaping the
Framework, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1264, 1272-1273 (2004).
10 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2510(6) (2006) (defining "person" under the statute to mean "any
individual"), and 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (2006) (making it a violation for "any person" to
intercept wire, oral, or electronic communications, subject to certain exceptions), with
Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980) (holding that "a wrongful search and
seizure conducted by a private party does not violate the Fourth Amendment").
" See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2006).
12 See id. § 2511(2). Among other provisions, Title III permitted interception orders to
issue only pursuant to requests from specified officials in connection with investigations of
specified, serious crimes. Id. § 2516. The interception order was required to include a
finding that less intrusive investigative methods had been tried and had failed, or that those
less intrusive techniques would be futile or excessively dangerous. Id. § 2518(3).
Interception orders could be effective for no more than 30 days, and surveillance had to be
"minimized" so that only relevant communications within the scope of the interception
order were intercepted. Id. § 2518(5); Berger, 388 U.S. at 55-60 (requiring the submission
of an affidavit "alleging the commission of a specific criminal offense," a description of the
"particular communication, conversations, or discussions to be seized," and a return on the
order after it is executed).
" 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2).
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of any electronic, mechanical, or other device."l 4 By negative implication, this
definition distinguished between the "contents" of a conversation, which only
could be acquired pursuant to Title III, and non-content information such as
telephone numbers and signaling transmissions that were not subject to Title
III.'s
"Wire communication" was defined as:
any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the
transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection
between the point of origin and the point of reception.. furnished or operated by any
person engaged in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of
interstate or foreign communications.' 6
An "oral communication" was defined as any "communication uttered by a
person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to
interception under circumstances justifying such expectation."l7
Putting these definitions together, Title Ill applied to interceptions of the
contents of wireline telephone calls transmitted by common carriers, and to
any use of a device to intercept oral communications made under
circumstances that reflected a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
speaker.18
B. Terms and Structure of ECPA
Evolving communications technology soon tested the adequacy of the 1968
Act. By the time Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) began to consider amendments
to Title III in 1984, the common carrier, wireline environment was beginning
to yield to newer services and service providers.19 Mobile telephone service,
14 Id § 2510(4) (2006).
1 When Congress enacted ECPA in 1986, it added a new chapter, 206, to the United
States Code that defined a process by which government could obtain non-content
information associated with telephone calls through the use of so-called "trap and trace"
devices and "pen registers." 18 U.S.C. § 3121 (2006). A trap and trace records the numbers
from which calls are placed to a telephone; a pen register records the numbers that are dialed
from a telephone. Id. § 3127(3)-(4) (2006 & Supp. III 2009). More recently, the pen-trap
statute was amended to include governmental requests for access to email addresses and
other non-content information generated by newer communications technologies. See USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 216, 115 Stat. 272, 288 (2001).
16 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (2006).
7 Id. § 2510(2) (2006).
1 Id. §§ 2510(2), (4).
19 According to the narrative set out in the Senate Report on ECPA, consideration of an
amended Wiretap Act dates from Senator Leahy's inquiry to the Attorney General, in 1984.
This concerned the adequacy of existing law in order to protect the privacy of electronic
mail and computer-to-computer communications. S. REP. No. 99-541, at 2-3 (1986). The
Criminal Division of the Justice Department responded with "Federal law protects
electronic communications against unauthorized acquisition only where a reasonable
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though far from ubiquitous, was established and growing. 20 Telephone service
was available from non-common carrier sources not recognized in the 1968
Act, a result of deregulation and the divestiture of AT&T and its Bell System
monopoly.21 Computer networking had spawned new types of
communications, such as email messages and transmissions to data processing
services, that could be acquired from storage long after the communications
had been sent and received. 22
Congress easily addressed the first two developments in Title I of ECPA,
which amended the definition of "wire communication" in two ways.23 First,
Congress removed the definition's limitation of wire communications to those
facilitated by a "person engaged as a common carrier." 24 Second, Congress
modified the definition's description of the facilities used to carry wire
communications to include mobile as well as wireline telephone facilities. 25
With these changes, the drafters ensured that the new statute would protect all
wireline and wireless voice communications transmitted by an established or
competing carrier.
Congress also ensured protection for email and other computer-to-computer
communications by adopting a new category of "electronic communication,"
which was defined as "any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds,
data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire,
radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic, or photooptical system . . .."26 In order
to avoid double classification of telephone conversations as both "wire" and
"electronic," the definition of electronic communication expressly excluded
expectation of privacy exists." Id. at 4. This was equivalent to saying that such
communications were protected, if at all, only by the Fourth Amendment.
20 Timothy L. Gustin, The Perpetual Growth and Controversy of the Cellular
Superhighway: Cellular Tower Siting and the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 23 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 1001, 1003 (1997) (discussing the growth of cellular phone use and tower
construction since 1983).21 S. REP. No. 99-541, at 2-3 (1986).
22 Id. at 3.
23 Id. at 11, 54-55.
24 Id.
25 ECPA's new definition of wire communication was "any aural transfer [i.e., a transfer
containing the human voice] made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the
transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between
the point of origin and the point of reception (including the use of such connection in a
switching station) furnished or operated by any person engaged in providing or operating
such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign communications or
communications affecting interstate or foreign commerce and such term includes any
electronic storage of such communication." Id. The newly-added phrase "including the use
of such connection in a switching station" was intended to capture wire facilities in a
cellular company's mobile telephone switching office, which are involved in any cellular
call, including those between one cell phone and another. Id. at 54-55.26 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12).
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"any wire or oral communication."27
The new statute created two categories of service providers: (1) the
electronic communication service ("ECS"), which provides users the ability to
send or receive wire or electronic communications; and (2) the remote
computing service ("RCS"), which provides to the public computer storage or
processing services by means of an electronic communication system.28
Extending the 1968 Act's protections to include stored communications
presented a more difficult problem that required more drastic changes. The
1968 Act established rules for surveillance of fleeting telephone calls and oral
conversations,29 but those rules did not address how the government could
lawfully obtain access to communications stored on the facilities of service
providers. Unfortunately, the drafters of Title III did not foresee that stored
information would become an integral part of modem communications, and
that individuals' privacy expectations concerning stored communications
would be as strong as their expectations for communications acquired in real
time.
The task of defining the circumstances under which communications could
be acquired from storage was further complicated by the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. 30 There was little question that if a
person's communications were stored in a computer located at his home or
office, the police could only seize those communications pursuant to a
probable-cause warrant. 3 1 However, if those communications were maintained
27 Id. See also S. REP. No. 99-541, at 56. The definition of "electronic communication"
was so broad that it appeared to include wire communications, potentially making the latter
category redundant. Accordingly, ECPA added the term "aural transfer" to the wire
communication definition and defined electronic communications to exclude wire
communications. Id at 55-56. These modifications ensured that any communication
containing the human voice would be classified as a wire communication rather than an
electronic communication.
28 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(15), 2711(2).
29 Electronic surveillance at the time Title III was drafted consisted of two activities:
listening to wireline telephone conversations by connecting a device to the voice circuits
over which those conversations were carried, and listening to oral conversations through the
use of microphones, radio transmitters and other devices. The first of these activities was
generally referred to as wiretapping, and the second was referred to as electronic
eavesdropping or bugging. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 45-47 (1967). Both
activities involve the use of electronic or mechanical devices to acquire the contents of
communications in real time.
30 Compare United States v. Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (confirming that the warrantless
search of a home is unconstitutional), with United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)
(holding that seizure of information that is maintained by a third party does not require a
warrant).
3' See Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27 (police used a thermal imaging device to "penetrate" the walls
of a home to observe defendant growing marijuana prior to obtaining a search warrant; held,
the thermal image was inadmissible). See also United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966 (9th Cir.
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on the facilities of a service provider, Fourth Amendment protection arguably
was precluded by the third-party doctrine articulated in United States v.
Miller.32
In Miller, the Supreme Court found that a bank customer had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in financial documents he had "voluntarily conveyed to
the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business."33
Therefore, the government's compelled acquisition of information from the
bank was not a "search" for Fourth Amendment purposes. 34 Extending this
rationale to communications services, it could be argued that an individual who
sends communications over the facilities of a service provider, which then
stores the communications, has "voluntarily conveyed" those communications
to the service provider and to have lost her Fourth Amendment expectation of
privacy in that information. 35
The arguable absence of Fourth Amendment protection for communications
stored with a service provider has important consequences. If the government's
compelled acquisition of information is not a Fourth Amendment "search,"
then the government is not required to obtain a warrant based upon probable
cause, but instead may proceed with a subpoena or similar process.36 Unlike
warrants, subpoenas may be based upon a mere possibility that the items or
information produced will be relevant to the subject matter of an
investigation. 37 Issuance of a subpoena does not require the government to
make a showing of probable cause before a magistrate that the items or
information produced are themselves connected with the commission of a
-38
crime.
The 1986 Senate ECPA Report acknowledged that a communication
2006) (discussing the probable cause and scope requirements of a warrant issued for a
search for computer storage media). See Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored
Communications Act, and a Legislator's Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1208, 1215 (2004) ("home computers are already protected by the Fourth Amendment, so
statutory protections are not needed").
32 See Miller, 425 U.S. at 435.
3 Miller, 425 U.S. at 442-444.
34 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S.
332, 335-36 (1973); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966).
" Miller, 425 U.S. at 442.
36 Patricia L. Bellia & Susan Freiwald, Fourth Amendment Protection for Stored E-mail,
2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 121, 127-128 (2008).
37 Christopher Slobogin, Subpoenas and Privacy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 805, 810 (2005).
38 As Orin Kerr has pointed out, some courts have suggested that even if the Fourth
Amendment applies to a request for information stored with a third party service provider,
the Fourth Amendment's requirement of reasonableness may be satisfied by a subpoena that
seeks relevant information and is not overbroad. Kerr, supra note 31, at 1211-12. As
Professor Kerr also points out, the Fourth Amendment does not restrain non-governmental
service providers from conducting private searches and sharing the results with the
government. Id
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"subject to control by a third party computer operator" might, like the bank
records in Miller, "be subject to no constitutional privacy protection."39 At the
same time, Congress recognized that "[flor the person or business whose
records are involved, the privacy or proprietary interest in that information
should not change" simply because the information is stored with a service
40provider rather than on the premises of that person or business. Accordingly,
Congress concluded that some level of protection for stored communications
was appropriate. Therefore, Title II of ECPA added chapter 121, often referred
to as the Stored Communications Act.41
Chapter 121 is comprised of three principal sections: section 2701 (unlawful
access to stored communications); section 2702 (disclosure of contents); and
section 2703 (requirements for governmental access). The following discusses
each of these sections in turn.
1. ECPA Section 2701: General Prohibition Against Unauthorized Access
Section 2701 of ECPA sets out a broad set of prohibitions against
unauthorized access to stored communications.42 Specifically, section 2701
makes it unlawful for any person to intentionally access, without authorization,
a facility through which an ECS is provided, and thereby obtain, alter, or
prevent authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in
electronic storage on that system.43 It also is unlawful to intentionally exceed
an authorization to access a facility through which an ECS is provided, and
thereby obtain, alter or prevent authorized access to a wire or electronic
communication while it is in electronic storage on that system.44
Section 2701 includes a number of exceptions to its unauthorized access
prohibition.45 Specifically, there is no liability for conduct that the person or
entity providing a wire or electronic communications service has authorized, or
for conduct that a user of that service has authorized with respect to a
communication of or intended for that user.46 There are also exceptions for
3 S. REP. No. 99-541, at 3 (1986).
40 id
41 The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
508 (1986). The nomenclature of ECPA's various parts can be confusing. Chapter 121,
consisting of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2709, sometimes is referred to as the Stored
Communications Act ("SCA"), but often is referred to simply as part of ECPA. This article
follows the convention of referring to the Stored Communications Act provisions as chapter
121 of ECPA.
42 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2006).
43 Id. § 2701(a)(1).
'Id. § 2701(a)(2).
45 Id. § 2701(c).
46 Id § 2701(c)(l)-(2).
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conduct authorized in sections 2703 (compelled governmental access), 47 2704
48 4(backup preservation), and 2518 (interception orders).4 9
2. ECPA Section 2702: Voluntary Disclosures
The Fourth Amendment does not restrict the ability of private parties to
make voluntary disclosures of communications to the government, nor does it
prevent service providers from disclosing the contents of customer
communications and information to other private parties. To ensure some
level of privacy protection for subscribers and customers against voluntary
disclosures by service providers, Congress wrote section 2702 of ECPA.5
Unfortunately, the provisions of section 2702 require a service provider to sort
through a tangle of categories, definitions, overlapping rules, and confusing
exceptions in order to decide whether a particular disclosure of a
communication or customer record is permitted.52 To illustrate these
complexities, it might be helpful to examine a series of hypotheticals.
a. Content Requests from a Private Party to a Provider ofECS
to the Public
Suppose an employer retains a large, commercial email service provider to
furnish email service for the workplace use of his employees. The employer
then asks the service provider to disclose the contents of an employee's email
messages to and from the employer's competitor. The email provider consults
section 2702 of the statute and discovers that, because it is a provider of ECS
to the public, it may not divulge the contents of those messages unless the
exceptions set out in that section apply.53 Those exceptions include the
delivery to the intended recipients of those communications and other lawful
SId. § 2703.
48 Id. § 2704.
49 Id § 2518.
50 See discussion, supra note 10. See also United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 351
(1967); United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 364 (2010).
5 S. REP. No. 99-541, at 35 (1986).
52 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(l)-(8) (listing eight exceptions for disclosure of
communications); id § 2702(c)(l)-(6) (listing six exceptions for disclosure of customer
records); id § 2710 (defining terms like "consumer," "ordinary course of business," and
"personally identifiable information"); id. § 2711 (defining the terms used in the entire
chater, i.e., §§ 2701-12).See id § 2702(b)-(c) (detailing the exceptions for disclosure of communications and
customer records, respectively). This only relates to the disclosures of the contents of
communications-not disclosures of subscriber information or transactional records. We
turn to those non-content items below.
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purposes "necessarily incident to the rendition of the service or to the
protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service . . . . "54
Section 2702's exceptions also permit divulgence of the contents of
communications with the lawful consent of "the originator or an addressee or
intended recipient of such communication"-in this case, the employee or the
person to whom the employee's emails were sent or from which they were
received.55 Accordingly, in the absence of consent by the employee or the
employee's correspondents, or unless one of the other statutory exceptions
applies, the email provider must refuse the employer's request. 56
Alternatively, suppose the employer brings litigation against the employee.
Even if the employer were to later file suit against the employee and present
the email provider with a civil subpoena demanding the contents of those same
emails, none of the section 2702 exceptions would apply. 57 As a result, the
provider would be required to give the same, negative answer.
b. Content Requests from a Governmental Entity to a Provider
ofECS to the Public
Varying the facts a bit, suppose the request for emails comes from the local
sheriff pursuing an official investigation. The section 2702 exceptions do not
permit voluntary disclosure to a governmental agency, except in narrow
circumstances that presumably do not apply here. 58 However, section 2702
permits disclosures authorized by section 2703, which outlines the means by
which governmental entities may compel disclosures through warrants,
subpoenas and other procedures. 59 Accordingly, voluntary disclosure to the
sheriff is not permitted, but compliance with a warrant or other process served
by the sheriff is allowed.
54 Id. § 2702(b)(5).
ss Id. § 2702(b)(3). In the case of a remote computing service provider, the consent of the
subscriber, rather than the originator or addressee, is necessary. Id.
s6 If the employer's request was instead directed to an entity classified as a provider of
RCS to the public, the disclosure would be permitted with the consent of the employer as
the service's subscriber. Id. § 2702(b)(3). Consent of the employee or the employee's
correspondents would not be required. See discussion, infra Section IV.C.
" Id § 2702(b)-(c) (neither subpart's exceptions covers subpoenas brought by non-
governmental litigants).
" Id. § 2702(b)(7)-(8). Among other exceptions, a service provider to the public "may
divulge the contents of a communication to a law enforcement agency if the contents were
inadvertently obtained by the service provider; and appear to pertain to the commission of a
crime; or...if the provider, in good faith, believes that an emergency involving danger of
death or serious physical injury to any person requires disclosure without delay of
communications relating to the emergency." Id.
" Id §§ 2702(b)(2), 2703(a)-(d) (2006).
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c. Content Requests from a Private Party to a Non-Public
Provider of ECS
Suppose instead that a private entity directs a request for some piece of
stored information to another private entity that maintains a self-contained
internal communications network. Section 2702 does not address the
obligations of employers, private networks, and other entities that do not hold
themselves out to serve the public.60 As a result, subject to any other privacy
assurances the employer may have given, it is free to disclose the contents of
its employee's emails to a private third party.6 1 The employer is also permitted
to divulge the contents of those emails in response to a civil subpoena
presented by the private third party.62
d Content Requests from a Governmental Entity to a Non-
Public ECS Provider
What if the private company is asked to disclose the contents of an
employee's communications voluntarily to a governmental entity? Again,
because the non-public service provider is not subject to section 2702, it is not
required to apply the exception permitting disclosures that are authorized by
section 2703 when it deals with a governmental entity.6 The
company/employer may turn over the emails to the governmental entity
voluntarily. However, the governmental entity cannot compel it to do so
except pursuant to the procedures described in section 2703. This is because
the employee's emails, whether held on a private or public service, enjoy the
privacy interests recognized by section 2703 when it imposes constraints on
governmental access to stored electronic communications.
e. Non-Content Requests
It is also important to consider disclosures of customer or subscriber records
that do not include the contents of communications. Under section 2702(a)(3),
any RCS or ECS provider "shall not knowingly divulge a record or other
information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service . . . to any
governmental entity."65 This rule is reinforced by section 2702(c), which
expressly states that an ECS or RCS provider "may divulge a record or other
60 Id. § 2702. This section only applies to public and commercial entities. Id.
61 Kerr, supra note 31, at 1223 ("Nonpublic providers can disclose without restriction.").
62 id.
63 Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c).
64 Kerr, supra note 31, at 1222-1227; 18 U.S.C. § 2703.
6518 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(3).
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information pertaining to a subscriber to or a customer of such service . . . to
any person other than a governmental entity." 66 Accordingly, "non-content
records can be disclosed to non-government entities without restriction." 67
Again, as in the case of ECS and RCS providers to the public, the private
entity's disclosure of various customer records to governmental entities may be
compelled only in accordance with the process described in section 2703.68
f Putting the Voluntary Disclosure Rules Together
The complex statutory language in ECPA yields the following rules:
1. A public ECS or RCS provider may disclose the contents of a communication
stored on its service to a governmental or non-governmental entity only where an
exception-such as the consent of a party or subscriber or service of process by a
governmental entity-applies.69
2. A public ECS or RCS provider may disclose non-content customer information to
any non-governmental entity.70 Disclosures of such information to governmental
entities may be made only where an exception-such as consent of a party or
subscriber or service of process by the governmental entity-applies.n
3. A non-public ECS or RCS provider may voluntarily disclose the contents of a
communication stored on its service to a private or governmental entity but may be
compelled to do so only upon service of process.72
4. A non-public ECS or RCS provider may disclose non-content customer information
to any private or overnmental entity but may be compelled to do so only upon
service of process.
3. ECPA Section 2703: Compelled Governmental Access
Section 2703 defines the circumstances under which service providers may
be compelled to disclose customers' communications and subscriber
information to governmental entities.74 Because of the unique potential of
governmental surveillance to undermine civil liberties, Section 2703 has
become the main focus of the present ECPA reform effort. 75
66 Id. § 2702(c)(6).
67 Kerr, supra note 31, at 1222.
61 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1). This section applies to both public and nonpublic companies.
Kerr, supra note 31, at 1222.69 See supra Section I.B.
70 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c).
71 Id. §§ 2702(c)(6), 2703(c)(1).
72 Id. § 2703(c)(1).
73 Id §§ 2702(c)(1), (4), (6), 2703(c)(1).
74 Id. § 2703.
7 See Appellate E-Communication Privacy Rulings Lend Impetus to Push for Reforms to
ECPA, 16 ELECTRONIC COM. L. REP. 129 (Jan. 26, 2011); 2010 ECPA Hearing, supra note
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Section 2703 creates an intricate set of requirements for governmental
access to stored communications and subscriber information. Whether a
governmental entity must obtain a probable-cause warrant or a less demanding
form of process in order to compel disclosure of stored information depends
upon three sets of distinctions: (1) the distinction between the contents of a
communication and non-content information; (2) the distinction between an
ECS and an RCS; and (3) the distinction between communications stored with
an ECS for 180 days or less and communications stored for more than 180
76
days. The interplay of these classifications produces different levels of
protection for different types of information. In some circumstances a warrant
is required; in other circumstances, disclosure of the requested information
may be compelled upon service of a subpoena or of a specific type of court
order, not based upon probable cause, which is authorized by section 2703(d).
The following describes these circumstances, and the types of process
involved, in more detail.
a. When Section 2703 Requires a Probable-Cause Warrant
Section 2703 requires a probable-cause warrant only in a narrow set of
circumstances: when the government seeks to compel disclosure of (1) the
contents of a communication (2) that has been in electronic storage (3) with an
ECS (4) for 180 days or less. Each of these four predicates for the warrant
requirement requires some explanation.
i . The Content-Noncontent Distinction
The distinction between content and non-content information is
fundamental. When the government seeks access to the "contents of an
electronic communication that is in electronic storage," it may be required to
obtain a probable-cause warrant. However, a warrant is never required-
although one may be used-for compelled governmental access to non-content
information.77
Fortunately, "contents" is a defined term in ECPA. "[W]hen used with
respect to any wire, oral, or electronic communication, [contents] includes any
3, at 8 (statement of James X. Dempsey, Vice President for Public Policy, Center for
Democracy & Technology), http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Dempsey 100505.pdf;
id. at 3 (statement of Marc J. Zwillinger, Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law
Center), http://commcns.org/sGqzzL.
7 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2006). This discussion of section 2703 describes the section in effect
today, including amendments made to that section since 1986. The discussion of sections
2702 and 2701 also refers to the current versions of those sections.
" Id. § 270 3(c)(2).
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information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that
communication."78 Accordingly, any information that assists with the routing
or addressing of a communication, identifies the time of the communication, or
conveys information about a subscriber other than the contents of the
subscriber's communications, falls outside the contents category.
ii. Electronic Storage
Electronic storage is defined as "any temporary, intermediate storage of a
wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission
thereof; and . . . any storage of such communication by an electronic
communication service for purposes of backup protection of such
communication." 79 Although this seems straightforward enough, application of
this definition has proved confusing in practice.
The principal confusion about "electronic storage" involves emails that have
been delivered and opened by their recipients and that remain in "post-
transmission" storage on the service provider's facilities. In Fraser v.
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, a federal judge in Pennsylvania found
that emails stored on a service after the recipient had opened them were neither
in "temporary, intermediate storage" nor in "backup storage."80 Therefore, they
were not protected by ECPA. 8 However, in 2003 the Ninth Circuit took the
opposite view, finding that post-transmission storage of emails served a backup
function for purposes of the electronic storage definition, and that those emails
therefore were protected by ECPA.82 As discussed below, the United States
Department of Justice prefers the Fraser position.
iii. The ECS-RCS Distinction
The level of protection for stored communications also varies according to
whether the service on which the communication is stored is an ECS or RCS. 84
As noted earlier, ECPA defines an ECS as "any service which provides to
users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic
Id. § 2510(8).
79 Id. § 2510(17).
80 Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d 623, 635 (E.D. Pa. 2001), aff'd in
part and remanded in part, Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 2003).
,' Id
82 Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2003).
83 See discussion, infra Part I.A.
84 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34693, ONLINE DATA COLLECTION AND DISCLOSURE TO
PRIVATE ENTITIES: SELECTED FEDERAL LAWS AND SELF-REGULATORY REGIMES 8 (2011).
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communications. An RCS is defined as "the provision to the public of
computer storage or processing services by means of an electronic
communications system."86 In 1986, most communications services and
remote computing services could readily be classified in one or the other of
these categories. However, more recent technologies, such as social networks
and interactive websites, have put these classifications under considerable
strain.
iv. "Time-in-Storage" on an ECS
Chapter 121 gives the contents of communications stored on ECS facilities
for 180 days or less greater protection than communications stored for more
than 180 days.87 While governmental access to the contents of communications
stored by an ECS for 180 days or less will require a warrant,88 access to
contents of communications stored for more than 180 days may be obtained
with only an administrative subpoena, a grand jury subpoena, or a 2703(d)
order.89
The rationale for these "time-in-storage" distinctions appear to be based on
the limitations of 1986-era technology and the expectations those limitations
created. 90 When ECPA was enacted, email service providers lacked the storage
capacity to maintain customers' emails on their servers for long periods of
time.9 ' ECPA's drafters likely assumed that any email stored in a provider's
server for more than 180 days had never been retrieved by the customer, giving
that customer a weak or nonexistent expectation of privacy in the contents of
92the message. The result is a statutory scheme in which emails stored on the
customer's own computer are protected by a warrant requirement regardless of
time spent in storage, but access to emails in remote storage on an ECS may or
85 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15).
"Id. § 2711(2).
87 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (requiring a warrant for disclosure of contents of
communications stored on an ECS for 180 days or less), with 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b) (requiring
a type of subpoena or a 2703(d) order for disclosure of contents of communications stored
on an RCS).
Id. § 2703(a).
89 Id. § 2703(b).
90 ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Cloud Computing Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 11Ith Cong.
1-3 (2010) (statement of Marc J. Zwillinger, Adjunct Professor, Geo. U. L. Center, and
Partner, Zwillinger Genetski LLP), http://commcns.org/sROOwW.
91 See Achal Oza, Amend the ECPA: Fourth Amendment Protection Erodes as E-Mails
Get Dusty, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1043, 1072 (2008). See also Ari Schwartz, Deirdre Mulligan &
Indrani Mondal, Storing Our Lives Online: Expanded Email Storage Raises Complex Policy
Issues, I I/S J. OF L. AND POL'Y FOR THE INFO. Soc'y 597-599 (2005).92 See Oza, supra note 91, at 1072.
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may not require a warrant, depending upon how long they have been stored. 93
b. When Section 2703 Does Not Require a Warrant: Lesser
Forms ofProcess
When the circumstances of a governmental request for information do
not trigger ECPA's warrant requirement, a number of other types of process
may come into play.
In many cases, disclosure will be demanded under a special process
defined in section 2703(d) of ECPA. These so-called "2703(d) orders" require
the requesting governmental entity to offer a court "specific and articulable
facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a
wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought,
are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation." 94 The statute
permits the use of 2703(d) orders for access to the contents of communications
stored with an ECS for 180 days or less, or for access to the contents of
communications stored with an RCS. 95 These orders also may be used to gain
compelled access to subscriber records.96 Use of the section 2703(d) process,
unlike a warrant, typically will require prior notice to the affected customer or
subscriber; however, delayed notice may be given in certain circumstances. 97
Governmental access to information may, in some cases, be based upon an
administrative, grand jury, or trial subpoena. Subpoenas are sufficient to
acquire information stored with an RCS or with ECS for 180 days or less.98
Subpoenas also are sufficient to compel disclosure of name, address, local and
long distance telephone billing records, telephone number or other subscriber
number or identity, length of service and certain other information of a
customer or subscriber.99 Disclosure of certain subscriber information may be
compelled pursuant to written request, in support of an investigation for
telemarketing fraud. 00
9 Kerr, supra note 31, at 1216-1219. See also Leonard Deutchman & Sean Morgan, The
ECPA, ISPs & Obtaining E-mail: A Primer for Local Prosecutors, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
ASSISTANCE, AMERICAN PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INSTITUTE 1, 14-15 (July 2005).
94 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
95 Id §§ 2703(a), (b).
96 Id § 2707(b)(2)(B).
97 Id § 2705.
98 Id. § 2703(b).
99 Id § 2703(c)(2).
"o Id. § 2703(c)(1)(D).
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III. AFTER 1986: NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND NEW CONFUSION
As the discussion of ECPA's origins shows, the 1986 statute was a response
to technological developments-such as email and mobile telephone service-
that were not anticipated when Congress drafted Title III in 1968.101 if
anything, the years since ECPA's enactment have seen an even greater number
of dramatic, disruptive developments in the technologies and services available
to users of electronic communications.102 Those developments include cloud
computing, searches conducted on the World Wide Web, social networking,
mobile geolocation technologies, and the enactment of various privacy laws
that are in some ways inconsistent with ECPA.103 Before discussing the ECPA
reform effort, it is helpful to describe each of these developments.
A. Remote Communications Storage and Cloud Computing
ECPA was enacted before the creation of the publicly accessible Internet
and World Wide Web.'0 To the extent computer networks existed in 1986,
business and government agencies tended to operate them over proprietary
facilities, rather than over systems controlled by third-party vendors.105 Remote
data processing was an important method of sharing mainframe computer
resources among multiple users but was not yet a pervasive method of
electronic communication and information exchange. 106
In that environment, ECPA's complex and inconsistent standards for
governmental access to stored communications made some sense. When email
101 James X. Dempsey, Communications in the Digital Age: Revitalizing the Federal
Wiretap Laws to Enhance Privacy, 8 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 65, 73-4 (1997); Susan
Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap Act, 56 ALA. L.
REV. 9, 41-2 (2004).
102 About the Issue, DIGITALDUEPROCESS.ORG, http://commcns.org/tzTZOZ (last visited
Dec. 15, 2011).
103 See, e.g., id.; Tim Berners-Lee Bio, W3.ORG (Sept. 8, 2011),
http://commcns.org/svphN (founder of the World Wide Web in 1989); Danah M. Boyd &
Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and Scholarship, 13 J.
COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMMC'N 210, 212 (establishing timeline for social networking
websites).
1 Tim Berners-Lee Bio, supra note 103.
105 Electronic Communications Privacy Act and the Revolution in Cloud Computing:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, Illth Cong. 1 (2010) (statement by Marc J. Zwillinger, Adjunct
Professor, Geo. U. L. Center, and Partner, Zwillinger Genetski LLP),
http://commcns.org/sROOwW; Mulligan, supra note 2, at 1560 (asserting that in 1986
businesses frequently chose to outsource data processing and storage).
106 Mulligan, supra note 2, at 1557, 1560-61 (asserting that commercial electronic mail
and commercial data processing centers services were emerging in 1986 but both primarily
served the business community).
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server memory was scarce and service providers did not retain opened
messages, it could be assumed that an email message stored on a service
provider's server for more than 180 days effectively had been abandoned by its
intended recipient.107 Therefore, it might have been appropriate to permit
governmental access to those communications upon presentation of less than a
probable-cause warrant. Similarly, at a time when businesses did not
extensively use third-party vendors to store confidential, digitized
communications, ECPA's differential treatment of information stored on a
business's own computers and that same information stored with a remote
vendor did not have dramatic consequences. os
In the years after 1986, the technical and business environment changed
substantially.109 Email providers' storage capacity increased as the cost of
computer memory declined, allowing them to offer enormous storage capacity
to their customers. o As a result, customers and businesses increasingly took
advantage of the growing efficiencies of remote storage and management of
their electronic communications and records. Most recently, "cloud
computing" has made the physical location of data obsolete as a factor in the
choice of vendors and service architectures. 112
At the same time, ECPA's increasingly artificial distinctions have resulted
in diverging interpretations of different categories of stored data. For example,
courts and law enforcement agencies have differed on the meaning of
"electronic storage" under ECPA. The Department of Justice maintains that
"electronic storage" refers only to "temporary storage in the course of
transmission by a service provider and to backups of such intermediate
communications made by the service provider to ensure system integrity," but
"does not include post-transmission storage of communications," such as when
an email customer keeps an opened email in his or her inbox. 113 The result is
107 Kerr, supra note 31, at 1234.
1o8 Julie J. McMurry, Privacy in the Information Age: The Need for Clarity in the ECPA,
78 WASH. U. L. QUARTERLY 597, 617-18 (2000) (asserting that when Congress adopted
ECPA in 1986, the narrow scope was adequate to protect electronic privacy in the much
smaller electronic communications systems because of the technology available at the time).
109 See 1980-2005-A 25 Year Timeline of Meetings Technology Innovation, CORBIN
BALL ASSOCIATES (Sept. 9, 2011), http://commcns.org/seRlzx (establishing a general
timeline of key milestones in computer technology).
110 Patricia L. Bellia, The Memory Gap in Surveillance Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 137, 143,
145-46 (2008).
"1 Deven R. Desai, Property, Persona, and Preservation, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 67, 116-17
(2008); Mulligan, supra note 2, at 1559-60.
112 NEWTON'S TELECOM DICTIONARY 286 (25TH ANNIVERSARY ED. 2009).
113 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPUTER CRIME AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SECTION,
CRIMINAL DIVISION, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC
EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 123-24 (2009), http://commcns.org/shGBtJ.
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that the Justice Department believes that it may obtain opened emails from a
service provider without serving a probable-cause warrant, regardless of the
message's time in storage.114 However, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit disagrees with the Justice Department's interpretation." 5 If
ECPA treated all stored messages the same regardless of the information
requested, the type of provider, and whether storage exceeds 180 days,
disputes of this kind would be moot.116
Even more dramatically, the Sixth Circuit ruled that the Fourth Amendment
precluded the government from obtaining a criminal suspect's emails from
storage on a service provider's facilities without a probable-cause warrant,
regardless of the messages' time in storage.'7 The court expressly
distinguished the circumstances of Miller on the ground that that case involved
"simple business records" rather than the "potentially unlimited variety of
'confidential communications"' obtainable from the appellant's email
account. The court also found that the commercial Internet service provider
holding the appellant's e-mails was an intermediary rather than an intended
recipient of the information, like the bank in Miller.119 In the view of the Sixth
Circuit, therefore, "to the extent that the SCA purports to permit the
government to obtain such emails warrantlessly, the SCA is
unconstitutional." 20 This decision increases the pressure to reform the variable
treatment of different stored communications in section 121.
B. Mobile Device Geolocation Data
Mobile telephones using cellular technology were used in 1986-in fact,
one of ECPA's purposes was to extend privacy protection to conversations
carried over those new devices.121 The mobile telephones of that era also
generated geolocation data, when they exchanged non-voice signals with local
cell sites for the purpose of setting up calls and handing off those calls from
one cell site to another.122
114 Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004).
" Id.
116 Id at 1076-1077.
117 United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 283 (6th Cir. 2010), reh'g en banc denied by
United States v. Warshak, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 5007 (6th Cir. Mar. 7, 2011).
" Id at 288.
1 9 Id. at 286.
120 Id at 288. "SCA" is a common abbreviation for the Stored Communications Act,
which is another way of referring to chapter 121 of ECPA. Id at 282.
121 99 CONG. REC. E4128 (daily ed. Sep. 19, 1985) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
122 Carlo Ratti et al., Mobile Landscapes: Using Location Data from Cell-phones for
Urban Analysis, SENSEABLE CITY LABORATORY, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY, 1, 9-10 (2006), http://commcns.org/sxlZTC.
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However, Congress did not anticipate in 1986 that mobile telephone
geolocation data would become a target of governmental surveillance, and
ECPA sets no standard for governmental access to that data.123 In recent years,
as the mobile networks' own geolocation information technology has
improved, and as precise global positioning system technology has been
implemented on smartphones and applications, law enforcement has
increasingly sought access to historical and real-time mobile device
geolocation data. 124
The legal picture is critically confused because ECPA offers no guidance on
these law enforcement requests. 125 Until 1994, requests for geolocation data
were made under the trap/trace statute, which requires only a showing of
relevance to an ongoing investigation.126 In 1994, the Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act effectively prevented governmental
access to geolocation data "solely pursuant" to a pen register or trap/trace
order,127 and law enforcement responded by combining trap/trace requests with
requests under chapter 121.128 These "hybrid" requests were not supported by a
showing of probable cause.129
Beginning with a decision entered in 2005, a number of courts have taken
the position that government may not compel disclosure of geolocation data
without first obtaining a probable-cause warrant. 130 These decisions create
123 See generally Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508,
100 Stat. 1848 (amending scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
124 Derek P. Richmond, Comment, Can You Find Me Now?-Tracking the Limits on
Government Access to Cellular GPS Location Data, 16 CoMMLAW CONSPECTUs 283, 283-4
(2007).
125 See Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 100 Stat. 1848. As the Third Circuit
recently observed, the courts "are stymied by the failure of Congress to make its intention
clear" on the matter of governmental access to geolocation data. In re Application of the
United States of America for an Order Directing a Provider of Electronic Communication
Service to Disclose Records to the Government, 620 F.3d 304, 319 (3d Cir. 2010).
126 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2) (2006).
127 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(B).
128 See In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location
Authority, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
129 id
130 See In re Application of the United States of America for an Order Directing a
Provider of Electronic Communication Service to Disclose Records to the Government, 620
F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010) (remanding government request for historical cell site data to
district court to resolve possible encroachment on customer's reasonable expectation of
privacy); United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom.
United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011) (prolonged GPS surveillance implicates a
person's reasonable expectation of privacy); In re Application of the United States of
America for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Information, 736 F.
Supp. 2d 578 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that government may not obtain two months' cell
phone tracking data without a warrant); In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace
Device with Cell Site Location Authority, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
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considerable pressure for an amendment to the statute that clarifies the
applicable standard.
C. Transactional Data Requests and Web Searches
One of ECPA's most important elements is the distinction between the
acquisition of the contents of communications and the acquisition of non-
content information concerning the circumstances of communications.131 The
latter category is often referred to as "transactional" data.132 Content
information is anything that discloses the "substance, purport, or meaning" of a
communication; everything else associated with the communication-
including the telephone numbers dialed, email addresses, and signaling
transmissions-is non-content transactional information. 133
Compelled governmental access to content, if accomplished simultaneously
with its transmission, requires a superwarrant as prescribed by Berger.
Alternatively, compelled governmental access to content stored with an ECS
may be supported by a warrant or, if notice is given to the subscriber, with
lesser process. However, compelled governmental access to transactional data
may be obtained under the pen/trap statute, requiring only a showing of
relevance.134 If the law enforcement agent requesting the transactional
information has made the required claim of relevance, the court must issue the
order and is not authorized to make an independent assessment of the basis for
the law enforcement agent's claim. 135
The World Wide Web brought new kinds of communications that could not
be as readily classified as "content" and "non-content" data. One of the most
important "communications" is the Web search, which includes search terms,
the URLs returned as search results, and the URLs of places visited on the
Web.13 A URL is like a telephone number because it points to a location, but
when associated with the identity of a website or the information it contains,
the URL can furnish content information. 37 Similarly, search terms typed into
131 See discussion, supra Section II.A.
132 See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (2006).
133 Id.
134 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55-64 (1967); 18 U.S.C. § 3131(c).
." 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a) ("[u]pon an application made under section 3122 (a)(1), the court
shall enter an ex parte order authorizing the installation and use of a pen register or trap and
trace device anywhere within the United States, if the court finds that the attorney for the
Government has certified to the court that the information likely to be obtained by such
installation and use is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.").
136 Matthew A. Goldberg, Comment, The Googling of Online Privacy: Gmail, Search-
Engine Histories and the New Frontier of Protecting Private Information on the Web, 9
LEWIS & CLAlK L. REv. 249, 263-267 (2005).
137 Id at 265
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a browser are queries, the content of which can be as expressive as a phrase
spoken on a telephone or text placed in an email message. 13 The URLs of the
sites a person visits, as well as the search terms a person enters, may reveal a
great deal about that person's interests and activities and could provide
evidence of criminal intent or motive. 139
Thus far, there are few reported decisions in which courts have attempted to
distinguish content from non-content components of these newer types of
communications. However, the few decisions that are available reflect a great
deal of judicial confusion.' 40 For example, one court suggested that when a
URL includes a search phrase, it crosses the boundary dividing a mere Internet
address (the primary function of a URL) from the content of a
communication.141 Another court, in considering a Fourth Amendment claim,
found that Internet users have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the IP
addresses of websites they visit, but stated that governmental access to the "the
[URLs] of the pages visited might be more constitutionally problematic"
because it can point to specific documents on a website.142
As new technologies and services continue to diverge from the clear
content-transactional data dichotomy of traditional telephone and email
services, the need for legislative guidance will grow.
D. Blurring of the ECS/RCS Boundary
The ease with which government may compel disclosure of stored
information varies according to whether the service provider is an ECS or
RCS.143 However, the application of ECPA's definitions of ECS and RCS was
and is not always obvious, even for electronic services of its era. For example,
when an email or text messaging service stores messages that have been
retrieved by their recipients, does the service become an RCS rather than an
ECS with respect to those messages? Recently, one district court concluded
that the function of storing retrieved messages was an RCS rather than an ECS
function, and accordingly concluded that the service provider could disclose
138 id
139 Patricia L. Bellia, Spyware and the Limits of Surveillance Law, 20 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1283, 1311-1312 (2005); Goldberg, supra note 136, at 265.
140 Compare Application of the United States of America for the Use of a Pen Register
and Trap on Internet Service Account/User Name, 396 F. Supp. 2d 45, 49 (D. Mass. 2005),
with United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2007) (demonstrating different
approaches used to distinguish content from non-content information).
Application of the United States of America for the Use of a Pen Register and Trap on
Internet Service Account/User Name, 396 F. Supp. 2d 45, 49 (D. Mass. 2005).
142 United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 n.6 (9th Cir. 2007).143 See discussion, supra Part II.B.3.a.
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the contents with the permission of the subscriber to the service, even in the
absence of consent by the senders or intended addressees of those messages.144
The appellate court disagreed, finding that the service provider remained an
ECS even after the stored messages had been retrieved. 145
Newer-generation services present even more difficult cases. An example
cited by Professor Orin Kerr questions whether eBay provides a data
processing (RCS) service when it takes in bids for an item, calculates which
bid is highest, and accepts the highest bid.'4Another unanswered question is
how a social networking site should be classified when it stores and processes
customers' profile information (which looks like an RCS function) and also
permits communication among customers and their "friends" (which might be
considered an ECS function).147 Given the different protections afforded to
ECS and RCS communications under ECPA, the answers to these questions
have consequences.148
ECPA's lesser level of protection for information stored on RCSs threatens
to disincentivize businesses and individuals from migrating to cloud computing
applications.1 49 As ECPA is written, communications stored on an ECS are
protected by a probable-cause warrant requirement if they are unopened or
stored for less than 180 days. 1o Communications stored on an RCS are never
protected by a probable-cause warrant requirement.'5 ' Proprietary and
confidential records stored with an RCS can be fully as sensitive and valuable
as emails stored with an ECS. Unfortunately, the ECS-RCS dichotomy fails to
recognize this reality.152 A business's decision to take advantage of, or forego,
'" Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1137 (C.D. Cal.
2006), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 529 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2008), rev'd sub nom. on other
grounds, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
145 Id. at 900, 902-903.
' Kerr, supra note 31, 1230-31.
147 Danielle Levine, Facebook and Social Networks: The Government's Newest
Playground for Information and the Laws That Haven't Quite Kept Pace, 33 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 481, 490-92, 494-96 (2011).
148 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2006).
149 Illana Kattan, Cloudy Privacy Protections: Why the Stored Communications Act Fails
to Protect the Privacy of Communications Stored in the Cloud, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
617, 626, 629, 631, 635, 637 & 639 (2010-2011). Communications for RCS are not
protected the same ways as ECSs are protected. Id. The customer or consumer is not
guaranteed notice that the records are being given under RCS. Id. RCS's usually are
considered public information; which is more accessible, while ECS is usually not. Id. See
also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPUTER CRIME AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SECTION,
CRIMINAL DIvisIoN, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC
EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS (2009), http://commcns.org/shGBtj (providing an
overview of the SCA).
o 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a).
' Id. § 2703(b).
152 ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Cloud Computing Before the Subcomm. on the
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the efficiencies of cloud computing should not turn upon these statutory
distinctions.
E. Effects of Other Privacy Laws
When ECPA was enacted in 1986, only a small number of sector-
specific laws protected the privacy of personal information entrusted to third
parties. The ensuing years have brought a number of such laws with
obligations and protections that are more strongly imposed than those of
ECPA, albeit in more specific contexts.154 The result is that a customer's
personal information might have weak protections when the entity holding that
information is subject only to ECPA and stronger protections when other laws
apply. 155
A recent case illustrates the danger. The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS")
issued an advice memorandum in response to an unnamed cable company's
objection to an IRS summons that requested the disclosure of subscriber
records.156 While the IRS conceded that disclosure of personal information
concerning a cable subscriber could not be made pursuant to a summons under
the privacy provisions of the Cable Act, it pointed out that the cable company
also provided Internet access and telephone service. To that extent, the
company was considered an ECS under ECPA. 57 As a result, the cable
company could disclose the subscriber's personal information because the
Cable Act contains an exception for disclosure of subscriber information and
because ECPA, unlike the Cable Act, permits disclosure of subscriber
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th
Cong. 7-10 (Sept. 23, 2010) (statement of Michael Hintze, Associate General Counsel,
Microsoft Corp.), http://commcns.org/tiAXDO; id. at 1-3 (statement of Richard Salgado,
Senior Counsel, Law Enforcement and Information Security, Google Inc.),
http://commcns.org/rAimzk.
" S. REP. No. 99-541, at 1-2 (1986); Existing Federal Privacy Laws, CENTER FOR
DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY (last visited Dec. 15, 2011), http://commcns.org/uyULj1
(listing only nine bills dealing with protecting personal information enacted prior to ECPA).
1 See, e.g., Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102,
113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C); Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996);
Dr. Roland Vogl, U.S. Information Technology Law, STANFORD UNIVERSITY (last visited
September 9, 2011), http://commcns.org/vlxTJy (listing the multiple bills that have been
introduced after ECPA).
155 Existing Federal Privacy Laws, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY (last visited
Dec. 15, 2011), http://commcns.org/uyULj1 (listing twenty-three privacy laws that target
specific subject matter areas).
156 Memorandum: Cable Communications Policy Act and Collection Summonses,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL (June 17, 2011),
http://commcns.org/vUkey6.
I57 Id. at 4.
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information pursuant to an administrative subpoena. 158 Although ECPA was
intended as a state-of-the-art privacy statute, this case illustrates the
shortcomings of both statutes.
More generally, ECPA's voluntary disclosure provisions are making the
statute an outlier in an increasingly privacy-conscious legal environment.
Existing statutes in the financial services, health care, and other industries are
making notice-and-consent the norm for disclosures of consumers'
information, and Congress is considering legislation that will extend that
model to all sectors of the economy. 159 At the same time, the Federal Trade
Commission's enforcement priorities emphasize the importance of adherence
to privacy policies that limit companies' discretion to collect and share
personal information.'60 In this environment, ECPA's failure to impose similar,
uniform protections for communications covered by chapter 121 on ECSs and
RCSs is increasingly anomalous.
IV. THE CURRENT STATE OF ECPA REFORM
As ECPA's inconsistency with emerging technological reality has become
more apparent, a number of public and private actors have sought reform of the
statute. The most notable of these initiatives are the work of the Digital Due
Process Coalition and Senator Leahy of the Senate Judiciary Committee.
A. Digital Due Process Coalition Proposal
In the spring of 2010, a broad coalition of civil liberties groups, technology
companies, academics, and individuals joined to take up the task of
recommending reforms to ECPA. 161 The goal of the newly formed Digital Due
Process Coalition ("DDP") was to improve ECPA's protections for individual
rights, remove uncertainties that were hindering the adoption of new
technologies and economic progress, and preserve the ability of law
enforcement to use legitimate surveillance and information-gathering
158 Id.
' See, e.g., BEST PRACTICES Act, H.R. 611, 112th Cong. § 103 (2011); Commercial
Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011, S. 799, 112th Cong. (2011); Financial Information
Privacy Act of 2011, H.R. 653, 112th Cong. § 502 (2011); Location Privacy Protection Act
of 2011, S. 1223, 112th Cong. § 2713 (2011).
160 See, e.g., In re Premier Capital Lending, Inc., Decision and Order, FTC No. C-4241,
at 4 (Dec. 10, 2008); In re Life Is Good, Inc., Decision and Order, FTC No. C-4218, at 3
(Apr. 16, 2008); In re Petco Animal Supplies, Inc., Decision and Order, FTC No. C-4133,
at 2-3 (Mar. 4, 2005); In re MTS, Inc., Decision and Order, FTC No. C-41 10, at 3 (May 28,
2004); In re Microsoft Corp., Decision and Order, FTC No. C-4069, at 3 (Dec. 20, 2002).
Robert X. Cringely, Bringing Internet Privacy into the 21st Century,
NETWORKWORLD.COM (Apr. 1, 2010), http://commcns.org/v0qNml.
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techniques. 162
DDP has not attempted to completely reform ECPA. Notably, DDP's
recommendations do not address foreign intelligence surveillance or the
voluntary disclosure provisions of ECPA.163 Rather, DDP's focus is on when
and how the government may compel the disclosure of communications,
transactional data, and customer information transmitted and maintained by
service providers during the course of criminal investigations." DDP has
announced four "consensus principles" that it believes should guide legislators
as they consider amendments to ECPA. 165
First, the government should be required to obtain a search warrant based on
probable cause before it can compel a service provider to disclose a user's
private communications or documents stored online.166 Adoption of this
principle would eliminate ECPA's present distinction between private content
stored on ECSs and similar content stored on RCSs.167 It also would eliminate
time-in-storage as the boundary between stored content subject to a probable-
cause warrant requirement and content that the government may obtain with
lesser process. 16 Furthermore, this principle would apply to all private users'
content, not just traditional "communications" such as email messages.169 The
probable-cause warrant requirements would apply to "word processing
documents and spreadsheets, photos, Internet search queries and private posts
made over social networks."
170
Second, the government should obtain a search warrant based on probable
cause before it can track, prospectively or retrospectively, the location of a cell
phone or other mobile communications device.171 Doing so would resolve the
ongoing confusion concerning governmental access to "data based on the
location of cell phones, laptops and other mobile devices.",172 It would require
a probable-cause warrant for real-time and historical data stored on mobile
devices and on the facilities of service providers. 73
162 Our Principles: Background, DIGITAL DUE PROCESS COALITION,
http://commcns.org/v7p9gl (last visited Dec. 15, 2011).
SId
6 Id.
165 Id.; In re Information Privacy and Innovation in the Internet Economy, Comments of
Digital Due Process, NTIA Docket No. 100402174-0175-01, at 2 (June 14, 2010),
http://commcns.org/sVfGlh.
" Our Principles: Background, supra note 162.
167 See discussion, supra Part II.
168 Id.
69 Our Principles: Background, supra note 162.
70 Id.
171 id.
172 id.
17 Id
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Third, before obtaining transactional, non-content data in real time about
when and with whom an individual communicates using any communications
technology, the government should demonstrate to a court that such data is
relevant to an authorized criminal investigation.174 There is considerable
uncertainty about the status of web search terms and other information under
ECPA. 175 When a court classifies that information as mere transactional data
rather than as the content of a communication, it will uphold the use of a pen
register and trap/trace as the government's method of compelling access to that
information.176 DDP does not propose legislation that attempts to resolve the
content/transactional dichotomy for all foreseeable types of data transmission
and does not favor imposing a warrant requirement for access to information
that is properly classified as transactional.177 However, this third principle
would reform the present trap/trace statute so that courts will have discretion to
reject applications for those orders that do not meet the present statutory
standard of reasonable grounds to believe that the information sought is
relevant to a crime being investigated. The present pen/trap statute appears
to deny courts that discretion.
Finally, before obtaining transactional data about multiple unidentified users
of communications or other online services when trying to track down a
suspect, the government should first demonstrate to a court that the data is
needed for its criminal investigation.!80 DDP does not propose to raise the
standard the government must meet when it seeks compelled access to non-
content information about individuals' Internet activity. The principle is
designed to address the concern about "bulk requests for information about
everyone that visited a particular web site on a particular day, or everyone that
174 Id.
175 See discussion, supra Part 11l.C.
176 See discussion, supra note 134.
177 Compare Our Principles: Background, supra note 162, with discussion, supra Part
111.3. But see Our Principles: About the Issue, DIGITAL DUE PROCESS COALITION,
http://commcns.org/uRCWeq (last visited Dec. 15, 2011) (guiding principles for ECPA
reform are not intended to solve everything).
178 Our Principles: Background, supra note 162.
17 Specifically, the federal pen/trap statute states that upon receiving an application
containing the representations required by the statute, a court "shall enter an ex parte order
authorizing the installation and use of a pen register or a trap and trace device . . ." 18
U.S.C. § 3123(a) (emphasis added). By imposing this "shall issue" requirement rather than
a "may issue" provision, the pen/trap statute appears to deprive the court of authority to
assess the credibility of the statements made in the application.
'go Our Principles: Background, supra note 162.
181 Compare Our Principles: Background, supra note 162, with discussion, supra Part
I.A. But see Our Principles: About the Issue, DIGITAL DUE PROCESS COALITION,
http://commcns.org/uRCWeq (last visited Dec. 15, 2011) (guiding principles for ECPA
reform are not intended to solve everything).
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used the Internet to sell products in a particular jurisdiction.,182 For such
requests, the government would be required to show that such bulk data is
relevant to an investigation.183
Adoption of the DDP principles in a reformed ECPA would represent a
significant step forward. Notably, ECPA's artificial distinctions concerning the
status of stored data would be resolved, eliminating a needless complication to
the deployment of cloud computing services. 184 Also, mobile device
geolocation data would be put on par with other, equally sensitive information
that already is protected by a warrant requirement.185 Compelled governmental
access to transactional data, while still available upon a showing of less than
probable cause, would be subject to meaningful judicial oversight. Lastly,
blanket requests for records of online behavior would require a showing of
relevance. 186
B. Congressional Efforts to Reform ECPA
The above principles already have influenced a reform initiative on Capitol
Hill.187 On May 17, 2011, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) introduced S. 1011,
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2011, which
incorporates some of the DDP's principles.iss
The bill's most important provisions concern two subjects: (1) governmental
access to customer communications, such as emails, that are stored on the
facilities of the customers' service providers;189 and (2) government access to
geolocation data obtained from mobile devices and service providers.190 While
the bill would not satisfy all parties with a stake in these issues, it would clarify
and simplify ECPA's treatment of these questions considerably.
On the first point, Senator Leahy's response is straightforward. Under the
proposed bill, a government entity would be able to compel disclosure of the
contents of a stored communication only if that entity obtained a warrant
directing that disclosure.191 The warrant requirement applies regardless of
whether the service provider was classified as an ECS or RCS under ECPA
182 Our Principles: Background, supra note 162.
183 Id.
184 id.
185 id.
186 Id.
187 Id
188 Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2011, S. 1011, 11 2th
Con. (2011).
Id § 3.
'
90 Id. § 5.
191 Id. § 3.
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and regardless of the length of time the communication had been in storage.192
Similarly, and subject to some exceptions based on emergency circumstances,
threats to national security, or consent of the owner or user of a device, the
government must use a warrant to acquire geolocation information from a
device. 193 A warrant also would be required where the governmental entity
wants to obtain contemporaneous or prospective geolocation information from
an ECS or RCS. 194 However, if the governmental entity wants only to obtain
historical geolocation information from a service provider pertaining to a
subscriber or customer, process based upon less than a showing of probable
cause would suffice. 195
The proposed bill includes a number of other provisions, including a
clarification of the types of non-content records that law enforcement may
obtain with an administrative or grand jury subpoena. The bill also would
(1) modify ECPA's current provisions for delayed notice to individuals
concerning governmental access to their communications; (2) permit service
providers to disclose communications contents that are pertinent to responding
to a cyberattack; and (3) require the Attorney General and Secretary of
Homeland Security to report annually to Congress on voluntary disclosures
received under the "cyberattack" exception. Finally, it would clarify the
kinds of subscriber records that the Federal Bureau of Investigation may obtain
from service providers for counterintelligence purposes.198
C. Additional Necessary ECPA Reforms
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2011 may
not become law as written and it certainly does not please everyone in the
affected civil liberties, corporate, and law enforcement communities. 99
However, the fact that Senator Leahy has put his considerable prestige behind
ECPA reform is most encouraging.2o That said, the reforms under
consideration today do not begin to exhaust the need for improvement in the
192 Id.
193 Id. § 5.
194 Id. § 6.
195 id.
196 Id. § 3.
197 Id. §§ 4, 7.
198 id § 8.
1 Alice Lipowicz, Bill Would Require Warrants for Access to Cloud E-mail, Cell Phone
Location Data, FEDERAL COMPUTER WEEK (May 18, 2011), http://commcns.org/w0E5nn;
Juliana Gruenwald, Leahy Proposes Changes to Electronic Privacy Law, NAT'L J. (May 17,
2011), http://commcns.org/rGgtcU.
200 Hayley Tsukayama, Patrick Leahy Introduces Update to Electronic Privacy Law,
WASH. POST (May 17, 2011), http://commcns.org/tnzKFc.
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federal statutory framework for electronic surveillance and information
gathering. There are a number of future reforms that must be explored in order
to bring ECPA fully in line with the changed circumstances.
ECPA currently permits ECSs and RCSs to disclose information concerning
their subscribers, except the contents of communications, to non-governmental
parties without limitation.201 This latitude is inconsistent with obligations to
which those same service providers may be subject under other laws, such as
the customer proprietary network information ("CPNI") provisions of the
Communications Act and the subscriber privacy provisions of the Cable Act. 202
Additionally, it runs contrary to the ongoing trend of privacy law in the United
States, which is toward greater protection for personal information across all
sectors of the economy.203 Reform of the voluntary disclosure provisions of
ECPA should be a priority in the coming years.
Furthermore, providers of ECS and RCS to the public are generally
prohibited from disclosing the contents of communications stored on their
services to others, subject to a list of exceptions.204 Those exceptions do not
205include disclosures to civil litigants in response to civil subpoenas.
Accordingly, disclosures in response to civil subpoenas can put service
providers at risk of violating ECPA.206 This prohibition is a glaring exception
to the scope of permitted discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and counterpart state rules, which give civil litigants broad rights to obtain
information that may lead to the discovery of material and relevant
evidence.207 This exception has been persuasively criticized and is the subject
of a number of suggestions for reform.208 Future reform efforts should explore
201 See discussion, supra Part II.B.2.e.
202 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 222, 551 (2006). The CPNI provisions require telecommunications
carriers to obtain subscribers' approval before sharing certain subscriber information for the
purpose of marketing services not already used by the subscriber, and before sharing such
information with joint venture partners, contractors and other third parties. The Cable Act
privacy provisions prohibit cable operators from using their cable systems to collect
personally identifiable information of subscribers, or disclosing personally identifiable
information of subscribers to others.
203 See discussion, supra Part IV.B.
204 See discussion, supra Part II.B.
205 See, e.g., In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to AOL, LLC, 550 F. Supp. 2d 606, 607-09
(E.D. Va. 2008).
206 Id. at 609.
207 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
208 ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Cloud Computing: Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong.
123-25 (2010) (statement of Marc J. Zwillinger, Adjunct Professor, Geo. U. L. Center, and
Partner, Zwillinger Genetski LLP), http://commcns.org/sROOwW; 2010 ECPA Hearing,
supra note 3, at 10-18 (statement of James X. Dempsey, Vice President for Public Policy,
Center for Democracy and Technology).
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the possibility of permitting disclosures of communications pursuant to civil
discovery.
One of the most important exceptions to ECPA's prohibition on
interceptions of wire, oral, and electronic communications is for interceptions
made with the prior consent of a party to the communication.209 ECPA does
not define the form that such consent must take, requiring courts to supply the
answer.210 For example, employers commonly seek the benefit of this
exception by including it in employee handbooks.211 The theory behind this
approach, which courts seem to have accepted, is that if such notice is clear
and prominent, the employee's decision to use the employer's communications
facilities after receiving the notice demonstrates consent to eavesdropping. 212
However, one recent court decision has shown that employers must be careful
not to make statements or engage in behavior that might suggest a withdrawal
of the notice or a waiver of the right to monitor.213 ECPA should do more to
define the conditions that constitute adequate notification.
New methods of capturing the contents of communications for commercial
purposes raise questions about the form and sufficiency of user consent.214
Notably, an email service might scan the contents of customers' email
messages for content that suggests an interest in certain products and may
provide that information to behavioral advertising agencies that create
consumer databases and feed online ads on behalf of their clients.215 Under
ECPA, those service providers have violated the law if they have not obtained
user consent for those practices.216 Unfortunately, ECPA's failure to define
209 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (2006); Andrew R. Schulman, What Civil Practitioners Should
Know About the Federal Wiretap And Stored Communications Acts (2001), available at
http://commcns.org/tDQ43t.
1o Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d), with United States v. Rittweger, 258 F. Supp. 2d
345, 350-53 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
211 See Quon, supra note 144, at 1123-24.
212 See United States v. Rittweger, 258 F. Supp. 2d 345, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
213 See, e.g., Quon, supra note 144, at 1144 (discussing employer statements establishing
a reasonable expectation of privacy for Fourth Amendment purposes), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 529 F.3d 892, 907 (9th Cir. 2008) (concurring with the district court), rev'd sub nom.
on other grounds City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010) (declining to
decide whether the expectation exists but assuming arguendo that the expectation existed).
214 Compare Rittweger, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 346 (recordings of telephone conversations)
and Quon, supra note 144, at 1126 (employer review of employees' pager text message
transcripts), with Ads in Gmail and Your Personal Data, GOOGLE (May 20, 2011),
http://commcns.org/rlRlc8 (email service provider scanning personal email content for
tareted advertisement delivery purposes).
Ads in Gmail and Your Personal Data, supra note 214 ("Google does not and will
never rent, sell or share information that personally identifies you for marketing purposes
without your express permission.")(emphasis added).
216 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c) (2006).
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consent leaves users and service providers without guidance on this point.217 Is
a consumer's decision to use a monitored email service, after being given an
opportunity to read a privacy policy, sufficient to indicate consent? Or should
explicit opt-in consent, pursuant to conspicuous notice, be required? These
questions are the subject of inquiries by the Federal Trade Commission and are
addressed with varying specificity in pending privacy legislation, but are
also properly within the realm of ECPA reform efforts.
Furthermore, employers often wish to acquire the contents of emails and
other electronic communications from storage on communications facilities
furnished by the employer. 219 The right of an employer to acquire such
communications is clear when the service is provided by the employer's own
facilities.220 In such a case, the acquisition of the stored communications is
conduct authorized by the service provider for purposes of section 2701 of
ECPA because the service is not offered to the public.221
However, if the employer has outsourced a communications service to a
third-party vendor, that vendor is subject to the constraints of section 2702 as a
provider of ECS or RCS to the public.222 If the outside vendor is providing an
RCS to the employer, then it may divulge contents of communications with the
consent of the employer.223 Alternatively, if the outside vendor is classified as
an ECS under ECPA, the vendor may divulge employee communications to
the employer only with the permission of a party to those communications.224
Accordingly, employers that outsource electronic communications service to
vendors must consider how they will preserve their right to access and review
their employees' communications stored on those services.225 This concern
217 Id. § 2510 (failing to provide a definition for the term "consent").
218 See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, FTC STAFF REPORT: SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES
FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING 11-12, 33-37 (2009), http://commcns.org/t9HVjj;
Do Not Track Me Online Act, H.R. 654, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011); Commercial Privacy Bill
of Rights Act, S. 799, 112th Cong. §§ 202, 701 (2011).
219 See, e.g., Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232, 1233 (D. Nev. 1996)
(employer's Local Area Network initiated pager messages); Quon, supra note 144, at 1125-
262 ager message transcripts).
2 See, e.g., Bohach, 932 F. Supp. at 1236.
221 See, e.g., id. See also 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (c)(1).
222 18 U.S.C. § 2702.
223 Id § 2702 (b)(3) ("A provider ...may divulge the contents of a communication...with
the lawful consent of the originator or an addressee or intended recipient of such
communication, or the subscriber in the case of remote computing service. (emphasis
added)).
224 See Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 900, 903 (9th Cir. 2008),
rev'd sub nom. on other grounds City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
225 Compare Bohach, 932 F. Supp. at 1236 (employer who is provider of electronic
communication services may "do as they wish when it comes to accessing communications
in electronic storage"), with Quon, 529 F.3d at 900 (ECS subscriber cannot access
communications).
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impedes employers' decisions to outsource email services and implicates
employee privacy.
Finally, the pending reform effort has concentrated on ordinary criminal
investigations, largely ignoring the parallel universe of national security
surveillance.226 The foreign intelligence issues are murkier than those
associated with criminal investigations, primarily because the Fourth
Amendment baseline for national security investigations is less certain and
unquestionably lower than the recognized constitutional protections for targets
of domestic criminal surveillance.227 However, the reform of investigations
conducted under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act is just as important
as ECPA reform and raises many of the same concerns.228
V. CONCLUSION
Although ECPA's age is showing, its enactment was a forward-looking
legislative effort that has served remarkably well through some of the most
crowded decades in the history of technology. New technologies and services,
however, have strained ECPA's definitions and distinctions to the point of
unsustainability. As a matter of immediate concern, the public interest requires
Congress to clarify the privacy protections that individuals can expect with
respect to their nonpublic, stored information, regardless of the type of service
on which that information is stored or the time it has been in storage. Congress
also must create rules for governmental access to geolocation data and
transactional data, and begin the process of collecting public input on other
reforms discussed in this article that cannot be indefinitely deferred.
226 Cf Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2011, S. 2011, 112th
Cong. (2011) (failing to amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§
1801-1812 (2006)).227 United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, 407
U.S. 297, 322-23 (1972).228 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1812 (2006).
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